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HARMFUL SPEECH AND THE CULTURE
OF INDETERMINACY*
ANTHONY D'AMATO**

I advocate two propositions in this Essay: the constitutional
law of at least one category of content regulation of free speech
is indeterminate, and recognition of this indeterminacy has been
and ought to continue to be the Supreme Court's decisional basis
for protecting speech against content regulation. My claim that
the Court has actually used the idea of indeterminacy as a
decisional basis has probably not been made before, at least not
explicitly.
The category of speech I shall focus upon comes within the
general area of "harmful speech." There is no doubt that some
speech causes harm. According to Lawrence Tribe,
One may not be privileged to mislead a blind man into thinking
that a window is a door or to extort a sum for telling him the
truth. Justice Holmes was surely right that the first amendment does not protect "a man in falsely shouting fire in a
theater and causing a panic."1
Another example might be a news reporter who happens to
discover the present address of Salman Rushdie, author of The
Satanic Verses.2 The Shiite government of Iran has called upon
Iranians everywhere to track down and kill Rushdie.3 If the
reporter willfully discloses Rushdie's address, and within hours
of publication someone murders Rushdie, the reporter surely
cannot claim a first amendment privilege.
One might label the above examples Harmful Speech Type I.
Such a category would also include speech used to effectuate
fraud, misrepresentation, conspiracy, blackmail, and the like. What
these examples have in common, and what distinguishes them
from what I call Harmful Speech Type II, is that the factfinder

* Copyright © 1990 by Anthony D'Amato.
** Judd and Mary Morris Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University School
of Law. A.B., Cornell University, 1958; J.D., Harvard University Law School, 1961; Ph.D.,
Columbia University, 1968.
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2. S. RUSHDIE, THE SATANIC VERSES (1989).
3. Reaves, Moslem leader says hit squads hunt author, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 16, 1989,
at 1, col. 1.
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and/or decisionmaker- whoever is called upon to decide whether
a first amendment privilege exists-does not need to make a
judgment as to the harmfulness of the precise speech in question
in order to reach a conclusion that the speech caused harm.
Rushdie's particular street address is of no intrinsic consequence;
all the factfinder and/or decisionmaker needs to know is that the
disclosed address was Rushdie's. The harm in all these cases is
provable independently from the content of the speech.
Harmful Speech Type II includes cases in which the factfinder
and/or decisionmaker must arrive at a judgment, perhaps a better
word is "impression," 4 that harm must have occurred because
the particular utterance in question is itself harm producing. For
example, a speaker utters an epithet that allegedly causes emotional harm to members of a particular minority group. Whether
the epithet in fact caused emotional harm is a judgment that the
decisionmaker can hardly make independently from her own
judgment that this particular epithet caused harm.5 Professor
Tribe writes that "[t]he Constitution may well allow punishment
for speaking words that cause hurt just by their being uttered
and heard." 6 This is a good capsule statement of Harmful Speech
Type II, although Tribe does not divide harmful speech into two
distinct types.
My argument in this Essay is that Tribe's judgment in this
instance is wrong. The Constitution should not, and more importantly cannot, allow punishment for speaking words that themselves allegedly "cause hurt." I base my argument on what I
have elsewhere called "pragmatic indeterminacy." 7 Pragmatic

4. Perhaps the best term would be "subjective judgment," which well connotes what
I have in mind. Unfortunately, all judgments are more or less subjective; it is hard to
imagine what a purely objective judgment might be.
5. Suppose I am presenting a paper at a scholarly conference, and a commentator
refers to me as a "dumb wop." (The word "wop" originally came from the abbreviation
of the words "with out papers," referring to immigrants from Italy who arrived at Ellis
Island at the turn of the century.) Suppose the same commentator refers to my fellow
panelist as a "dumb nigger." Suppose he and I both sue the commentator for libel and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and suppose we can both prove, through expert
psychiatric testimony, the same degree of emotional distress and feeling of harm to
integrity and reputation. Nevertheless, it seems quite likely that a trier of fact will
sympathize more with my fellow panelist than with me, simply because the trier of fact
will probably find the word "nigger" intrinsically more harm causing than the word
"1wop."1

6. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, S 12-10, at 856. He adds: "The first amendment need not
sanctify the deliberate infliction of pain simply because the vehicle used is verbal or
symbolic rather than physical." Id. But how does Tribe know that "pain" was inflicted?
Who is supposed to determine that matter?
7. See D'Amato, PragmaticIndeterminacy, 85 Nw. U.L. REV. 148 (1990).
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indeterminacy is the current version of American legal realism,
stating that law-words,8 whether statutory or precedential, cannot
constrain judges to decide a particular case in a particular way.9
Many academics and jurists, who have claimed that judges can
correctly or incorrectly interpret and apply "the law" in individual cases, find the indeterminacy thesis to be a threat to their
professional lives. Consequently, they reject the thesis and have
called its proponents nihilists.10 Yet the Supreme Court, as I shall
try to show here, has not only accepted the indeterminacy thesis
in Harmful Speech Type H cases, but also for some time has
used indeterminacy as the decisional basis for its approach to
these cases.
Normally, the pragmatic indeterminacy thesis is not a cause
for alarm because even if law-words do not constrain judicial
decisions, we really want lower court judges to decide cases
according to their own sense of justice." Because "justice" perhaps can only be properly assessed in the full particularity of a
given case, we can accept the pragmatic indeterminacy thesis as
a mere descriptive statement that law-words cannot constrain
judicial decisions. Life goes on as usual under pragmatic indeterminacy because generally courts adjudicate cases in a way that
2
does not lead to organized social discontent.
Nevertheless, in some areas of the law we do not want judges
to decide cases at all-not justly or any other way. In these
areas, the mere possibility of judicial decisionmaking exerts a
chilling effect that can undermine what we want the law to

8. By "law-words" I mean everything that can be found in any law library or computer
retrieval system, such as case reports, statutes, regulations, law journals, philosophy
journals, books, newspapers, magazines, legislative histories, diaries, and biographies.
9. Although the meaning of "indeterminacy" is by no means settled, see Kress, Legal
Indeterminacy,77 CALIF. L. REV. 283 (1989) (attempt to define indeterminacy), and although

the term itself would seem to preclude any attempt to pin down its meaning, there is
general agreement that indeterminacy at least stands for the proposition that the words

of the law (statutes, precedents, rules, even theories of law) do not compel a decision for
one side or the other in any given case. See D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain
Any JudicialDecision?, 43 U. MIAmI L. REV. 513 (1989).
10. See Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 679 (1990)
("the legal academy is experiencing a state of epistemological crisis").
11. This sense of justice can include deciding the case "according to law" (whatever
that means), so long as the judge's interpretation of the law-words accords with her sense
of justice. One supposes that, for most judges most of the time, their sense of justice
accords with their interpretation of the available law-words. In this latter respect as
well, pragmatic indeterminacy is no cause for general societal alarm.
12. People do not normally protest against government by judiciary because cases are
more or less decided according to justice. Justice perceived can be a greatly stabilizing
element in society.
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achieve. Thus, Professor Tribe talks about the effect of selfcensorship that can arise from a well-founded fear that a trier
of fact "will not fairly find the facts in cases involving unpopular
speakers or unorthodox ideas." 13 We cannot achieve the goal of
freedom of speech if self-censorship takes place. Hence, in this
Essay I have chosen to focus on one of the most sensitive
categories of the free speech area: categories in which the trier
of fact might decide the question of "harm" by virtue of his or
her impression about the harmfulness of the particular utterance
in question. I contend for pragmatic indeterminacy reasons that
decisions in this area can go either way, entirely unregulated by
anything that the Supreme Court might lay down by way of
guidelines, standards, or admonitions. It would follow from my
thesis that prediction of the legal effect of one's utterance is so
problematic that self-censorship will surely occur. The consequence of my argument is that the Constitution mandates a more
sweeping stance: no cause of action should exist for allegations
of Harmful Speech Type II.

I.

THE IMPERATIVE OF CULTURAL INDETERMINACY

The conception of indeterminacy that I use in this Essay is
not merely jurisprudential; it stems from an indeterminate culture. The melting pot culture of the United States is fertile soil
for skepticism and indeterminacy. There may be a deep relation
between cultural indeterminacy and freedom of speech, a relation
that has animated not just Harmful Speech Type II cases but
perhaps most cases involving first amendment freedoms.
Law is rooted in culture. Judges do not make decisions "out
of the blue." Rather, judges are embedded in the cultural presuppositions that engulf us all. To examine the law of free speech
apart from social culture is like observing the motions of a
steamship without noticing the ocean: we will fail to account for
the movements of the boat if we refer exclusively to mechanisms
in the engine room and ignore the motion of the water. The
strong currents of our culture propel the constitutional law of
free speech.
The United States, consisting largely of immigrant peoples and
thought of as a "melting pot" of all racial, ethnic, and religious
groups, is a heterogeneous culture in which ideological conformity
is deeply suspect. In addition, strong traditions of individualism,

13. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, S 12-12, at 864.
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privacy, pluralist diversity, and pragmatism exist. In general,4
these elements would predict a wide tolerance for expression.1
To be sure, other countries have different mixes of social diversity and respect for individuality; a relatively homogeneous society that has evolved a greater respect for individualism than
the United States might possibly exceed our commitment to free
speech.
To these commonplace observations one might add the peculiar
fact that, in this century, admission to the bar in the United
States has been open to all, with the result that persons of the
poorest and humblest origins can and have become successful
attorneys and judges. Law is primarily a verbal endeavor, and
lawyers are socialized to be receptive to two sides of any story.
Freedom of advocacy is grounded on deep intuitions and convictions similar to freedom of speech. Because many higher court
judges are self-made persons who owe their success to verbal
skills and the ability to see both sides of an argument, judges
are likely to be somewhat ahead of society in championing freedom of expression. When the Supreme Court began to deal in
earnest with free speech cases under the first amendment at the
time of the first World War, some of the Justices were themselves self-made jurists from humble origins. Since the 1920's,
one may say fairly that the Court has been ahead of the American
public in securing-and teaching-respect for freedom of speech.

II.

THE USE OF INDETERMINACY

One of the most quoted and significant statements on personal
liberty by a Justice of the Supreme Court came in a first
amendment freedom of religion case in 1943:

14. Some writers have called for laws that would secure diversity by criminalizing
"hate speech" against particular groups. See, e.g., Matsuda, Public Response to Racist
Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989) (intolerance); Post,
The ConstitutionalConcept of Public Discourse:Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REv. 603 (1990) (community values in a
heterogeneous state). Although I disagree with Professors Matsuda and Post that the
state ought to enforce heterogeneity, their essays perhaps inadvertently constitute
another proof of indeterminacy: even given a theory (tolerance or communitarianism), the
theory itself admittedly can yield diametrically opposite applications (uninhibited speech
versus enforcement of tolerance by banning intolerant utterances).
Professor Post recognizes the dilemma and calls it "paradoxical." See Post, supra, at
684. If paradoxical is another word for "indeterminate," I would agree with Post. I fear,
however, that he believes that the paradox might be resolved by "articulat[ing] with
sufficient clarity what is actually at stake in the definition of public discourse." Id. at
683. That articulation is precisely what I believe cannot ever be done, not even by Post
in his superb 83-page article, which at the end left me, at least, completely in the dark
as to where his theory could lead a court in any conceivable future case.
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If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith
therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations
on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.15

"[N]o official, high or petty," is usually taken to mean elected
public officials or bureaucrats. Yet including judges and juries
within that phrase would be consistent with the spirit of Justice
Jackson's statement. If we allow judges and juries to make
rulings in cases involving "matters of opinion," officially preferring the content of some ideas over others, then they would be
no different from any "official, high or petty," in the phrase just
quoted. Clearly, the prescriptions and rulings of any public official, including the rules deriving from precedents established by
judges, can endanger freedom of exlression. 1 6 Indeed, invasion
of the "sphere of intellect and spirit" is most dangerous when
the official is a judge because a judge deals with the specific
facts of a case and the specific circumstances of the intellect and
spirit of the parties. Thought control is more efficiently accomplished in face-to-face confrontations, such as those that can occur
in court, than through the legislative process.
I suggest that what has become even more important than
deciding the limits of freedom of speech in this country is the
15. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (Jackson, J.).
16. The Supreme Court prefers to pin the indeterminacy blame on juries rather than
on judges. Justice Stevens, dissenting in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), said that
the guilt or innocence of a defendant in an obscenity trial should not be "determined
primarily by individual jurors' subjective reactions to the materials in question." Id. at
514 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia seemed to agree in concurrence: "It is quite
impossible to come to an objective assessment of (at least) literary or artistic value [of
allegedly obscene material] . . . . Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is
no use litigating about it." Id. at 504-05 (Scalia, J., concurring). In another major recent
first amendment case, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), said that the "outrageousness" test of Virginia law has "an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis
of the jurors' tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression." Id. at 55.
Nevertheless, clearly it is judges who allow cases to go to the jury, so that the
"officials" the Court must be concerned about, if the Court is to be effective in achieving
its will in the free speech cases, include judges as well as juries.
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decision not to let judges decide those limits.17 If I am correct
about this basic point, the operative question for the Supreme
Court becomes, "How can the Court prevent officials from making
such decisions?" One way that would not work would be to
attempt to define the parameters of freedom of speech based on
types of speech content. Such an approach would simply invite
pragmatic indeterminacy back in, allowing lower court judges to
decide as they please. For instance, if the Supreme Court were
to rule that the only speech that government may regulate is
speech whose content is marginal to or outside Jackson's "sphere
of intellect and spirit," such a prescription would obviously have
no constraining power on lower court judges. But the indeterminacy thesis goes much further. It says that no collection of
words about what speech the state may regulate will do the job.
No verbal prescriptions, no specifications, no reasoned opinions,
and no theories by the Supreme Court can adequately bar lower
court judges from prescribing what is orthodox in matters of
opinion.
Yet judges have to rule on controversies involving speech. To
the extent that the speech causes harm that is provable independently of a judgment that the particular words uttered caused
harm in themselves, judges must resolve those cases under the
fundamental Calabresi-Melamed proposition that courts exist to
redress harms. 18 However, cases that consider whether the harm
occurred, and in which the answer involves a guess as to whether
the actual words uttered must have produced the alleged harm,
come close to begging the question whether a harm occurred.
This is the area of cases I have labelled Harmful Speech Type
II.
My prime candidate for the role of indeterminacy as a decisional basis for the Supreme Court in a case of Harmful Speech
Type II is found in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Hustler
Magazine v. Fawell.'9 The courts below affirmed a jury verdict
against Hustler Magazine for the intentional infliction of emotional distress upon Jerry Falwell. 20 Hustler had printed a parody
of a Campari advertisement that exemplified Hustler's brand of

17. This is the "chilling effect" principle discussed in the text accompanying supra note
13.
18. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
19. 485 U.S. 46.
20. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub nom. Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
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outrageous humor. 21 The jury found that under Virginia law the
parody was "outrageous" in that it "offend[ed] generally accepted
standards of decency or morality." 22 The Second Restatement of
Torts sets out a "test" for outrageous conduct: "Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average
member of the community would arouse his resentment against
the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!' "2 Rehnquist,
speaking for a unanimous Court,24 held:
"Outrageousness" in the area of political and social discourse
has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a
jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors' tastes or
views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular
expression. An "outrageousness" standard thus runs afoul of
our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional
5
impact on the audience.2
Rehnquist appeared to be saying that "outrageousness" is too
subjective and standardless to constrain judges and juries. This
much is surely correct. The indeterminacy thesis, however, goes
much further: all law-words are inherently subjective. 26 Words
as subjective as "outrageousness" are used routinely in jury
instructions in all varieties of cases. These subjective words allow
juries to vote their tastes and preferences or allow judges acting
as triers of fact to use them routinely to justify their determinations. Such terms include "willful, wanton, and reckless" (torts
and criminal law), "malice aforethought" (criminal law), "good
faith" (contracts), "material" (contracts), "unconscionable" (contracts), "substantially different" (patents), "proximate cause"
(torts), "strict scrutiny" (constitutional law), "nuisance" (torts and
criminal law), and "reasonable person" (all cases)27

21. Id. at 1272.
22. This is the Virginia standard for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
at 1275 n.4 (quoting Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 342, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1974)).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1977), quoted in Post, supra note
14, at 623. The "test" is easily parodied. According to the RESTATEMENT (SIXTIETH) OF
PATENT LAW § 46 comment q (1999), "Generally, the test is whether an average member
of the community would resent the actor and be led to exclaim, 'Infringer!"'
24. Justice White concurred in the judgment, and Justice Kennedy did not participate.
Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 57.
25. Id. at 55.
26. I have tried to spell this out in D'Amato, supra note 7.
27. See Williams, Language and the Law, 62 L.Q. REV. 387 (1946).
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One might try to distinguish the term "outrageousness" on the
basis that it came into the law so recently2 that it has not had
the opportunity, afforded to many other "standards," to be well
delineated as a result of application to thousands of cases. That
distinction, however, does not work. All the terms I quoted are
as subjective as the term "outrageous." The fact that juries have
been able to decide whether certain conduct is "reckless" for
hundreds of years does not make that term determinate in the
next case with a new jury looking at a new set of facts.
To say that thousands of tort decisions flesh out the term
"reckless" makes no real difference to a newly empaneled jury.
First, the judge does not tell the jury about those thousands of
tort decisions when he or she instructs them to vote on whether
the defendant's conduct was reckless. Second, even if the jury
heard about those cases, the jury would not be able to remember
them, much less apply them to the facts of the instant case.
Third, the fact situations in past cases are sufficiently dissimilar
to the next case that such umbrella terms as "negligence,"
"failure to take reasonable precautions," or "reckless" cannot
meaningfully translate prior fact situations into the instant case
that the jury has heard in all its particularity. Fourth, the judge's
instructions typically use synonyms to describe "negligent" and
"reckless," yet the synonyms are not, and cannot be, more determinate than the word they define. Fifth, if one were to attempt
to construct a determinate meaning for the word "reckless" by
organizing the facts of thousands of cases, one would soon find
that the contexts in which those facts took place are unknowable
to readers of judicial opinions that "state the facts" in only
conclusory and summary fashion. We end up with the vacuousness
of a hornbook on tort law defining "reckless conduct" in sentences
constructed out of equally vague synonymous terms.
Thus, the Court's opinion in Hustler Magazine points the way
to a much further-reaching jurisprudence. Sooner or later, the
Court will recognize the pragmatic indeterminacy proposition that
no statutory language can constrain lower court decisions in the
Harmful Speech Type II area. Whether harm occurred just by
the utterance itself can be nothing better than a random guess.
III.

THE CONTEXT OF THE UTTERANCE

I have briefly mentioned the problem of interpreting words in
their context. Sometimes, however, people argue that context
28. Dean Prosser seems to have introduced the term "outrageousness" in 1939. See
Post, supra note 14, at 622.
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gives particularity to words so that reasonable people will agree
about what a word means in a given context. Thus, the argument
goes, when a jury learns about the full facts of a situation and
the context in which those facts took place, it can make a sounder
and more deterministic decision as to whether the speech harmed
the listener. By applying community standards, juries can determine whether, in Professor Tribe's words, the words constituted
a "deliberate infliction of pain."
The jury did just that, however, in Hustler Magazine. Yet the
Supreme Court second-guessed the jury as to context when it
held that the utterance in question was a parody that neither a
jury nor Falwell himself should have interpreted as an assertion
of truths about Falwell 0 Two years later, however, the Court
seemed to have forgotten the indeterminacy of context. Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co. 31 is an object lesson in the folly of attempting to remit the question of contextual interpretation to the trier
of fact.
In Milkovich, the Court reversed and remanded a libel case in
which a reporter in a news column implied that Milkovich, a high
school coach, lied at a court hearing.3 2 The Court attempted to
lay down guidelines of the sort that were impossible to lay down
in HustlerMagazine. Milkovich is worth examining at some length,
not only because of the Court's failure to come up with general
guidelines (after all, pragmatic indeterminacy predicts that failure!), but also because what the Court did say cannot even guide
the lower court on remand.
In Milkovich, the respondent newspaper implied in an article
that a high school coach lied under oath when testifying in an
Ohio common pleas court about a wrestling match fracas involving
the coach and his team. The following considerations were salient
in the Court's judgment.
1. A public accusation that someone committed the crime of
perjury clearly harms that person's reputation. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited Shakespeare: "[H]e that
filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not
enriches him, / And makes me poor indeed."3 3 The dissenters
agreed with this proposition.3 4 No one seemed to question the

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

L. TRIBE, supra note 1, 5 12-10, at 856.
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
Id. at 2697-98.
Id. at 2702 (quoting SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO III.iii).
See id. at 2709.
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assumption that merely saying that someone lied in court might
not in itself inflict harm to reputation. 35
2. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that expressions of opinion, as opposed to statements of fact, cannot
constitute libel.3 6 Rehnquist pointed out that the statement, "'In
my opinion Jones is a liar,' can cause as much damage to [Jones']
reputation as the statement, 'Jones is a liar."' 37 The dissenters
agreed with this proposition as well. 8
3. Rehnquist held that, given a media defendant in the present
case, the burden was on the high school coach to show falsity.3 9
The Chief Justice was careful not to say that the coach could
prove falsity on the negative facts that the common pleas judge
did not find the high school coach guilty of perjury and the public
prosecutor did not subsequently prosecute the coach for perjury.
Rehnquist felt constrained, however, to say that it was possible
for the coach to show falsity on the basis of the existence of a
"core of objective evidence." 40
The word "objective" suggests the possibility of a standard
that could resolve the issue in Milkovich. Curiously, the dissenters
seem to have assumed that no problem existed in this formulation.41 Yet unpacking what is purportedly "objective evidence" in
the present case reveals a veritable Finnegans Wake 2 of interpretive complexity of which the majority, not to mention the
dissent, seems to be unaware. Without going into exhaustive
detail, I will pick an example-the "shrugging" allegation-that
may indicate what is at stake with respect to this core of objective
evidence.

35. Saying that someone lied in court is not necessarily harmful to that person. If a
foreign power captured a CIA agent and forced the agent to testify in its court, we
would probably applaud the agent on his subsequent release if in fact he lied to that
court.
36. Id. at 2705-07. It is safe to predict that we will soon see a plethora of law review
notes and comments addressing the opinion-fact dichotomy in the Milkovich case. Because
we can draw no determinate line between fact and opinion, the alleged dichotomy can
lead only to unproductive theorizing.
37. Id. at 2706.
38. Id. at 2709-10 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan's
opinion. Id. For a sound, skeptical analysis, see Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law:
New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C.L. REv. 273, 300-11 (1990).
39. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706; Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S.
767, 777, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1134 (1986).
40. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707 (quoting Diadiun, Maple beat the law with the 'big lie,'
Willoughby News-Herald, Feb. 29, 1974).
41. Id. at 2699 n.2, 2708.
42. J. JOYCE, FINNEGANS WAKE (1939).
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According to the newspaper article at issue in the case, at the
high school wrestling meet,
Milkovich's ranting from the side of the mat and egging the
crowd on against the meet official and the opposing team
backfired . .. and resulted in first the Maple Heights team,

then many of the partisan crowd attacking the Mentor squad
43
in a brawl which sent four Mentor wrestlers to the hospital.
A hearing by the Ohio High School Athletic Association Board
of Control followed, resulting in the placement of Milkovich's
Maple Heights team on probation for a year.44 The author of the
newspaper article, J. Theodore Diadiun, goes on to say the
following about Coach Milkovich and Superintendent of Schools
H. Donald Scott:
[T]hey chose to come to the hearing and misrepresent the
things that happened to the OHSAA Board of Control, attempting not only to convince the board of their own innocence,
but, incredibly, shift the blame of the affair to Mentor.
I was among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which
the trouble broke out, and I also attended the hearing before
the OHSAA, so I was in a unique position of being the only
non-involved party to observe both the meet itself and the
Milkovich-Scott version presented to the board.
Any resemblance between the two occurrances [sic] is purely
coincidental.
To anyone who was at the meet, it need only be said that
the Maple coach's wild gestures during the events leading up
to the brawl were passed off by the two as "shrugs," and that
Milkovich claimed he was "Powerless to control the crowd"
45
before the melee.
The Board of Control seemingly did not accept Milkovich's
story- and placed him on probation, 46 but the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas reversed the Board. Apparently, the court accepted Milkovich's story.
Rehnquist stated that a determination of whether Milkovich in
fact lied to the court of common pleas "can be made on a core
of objective evidence by comparing, inter alia, [Milkovich's] tes-

43.
44.
45.
46.

Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698-99 n.2 (quoting Diadiun, supra note 40).
Id. at 2698.
Id. at 2699 n.2 (quoting Diadiun, supra note 40).
Id. at 2698.
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timony before the OHSAA board with his subsequent testimony
before the trial court.."47 But what did Rehnquist expect that
such a comparison would reveal? There are only two logical
possibilities: (1) Milkovich told the OHSAA board the same thing
he told the trial court, or (2) Milkovich told the OHSAA board
one story and the trial judge a different story. In the first
situation, there can be no objective evidence of perjury on the
basis of comparing two stories that are the same; Milkovich may
have been lying consistently. In the second situation, even if
Milkovich told the judge a different story from the one he told
the OHSAA board, we cannot determine from the fact that the
two stories were different whether he lied to the trial judge. It
is equally probable that he lied to the OHSAA board and told
the trial judge the truth. Hence, in either situation, the core of
objective evidence simply does not exist.
On remand, the Supreme Court gave Milkovich no guidance.
He has no way to prove that he was telling the truth to the trial
judge. Similarly, the Court gave Diadiun no guidance. All he can
do is repeat his story that he saw Milkovich ranting, not shrugging, and that he said so in his column. 48
Nor has the Court given the trial judge any guidance on
remand. How is the judge supposed to determine whether Milkovich was shrugging or ranting? If he asks the partisan crowd
that was present at the wrestling meet, they might side with
Coach Milkovich's version. But is not a newspaper reporter
entitled to report what he sees? Does not the first amendment
privilege him to report that Milkovich was ranting, if that is
what he saw, rather than constrain him under fear of legal
punishment to report what a partisan crowd might want him to
report? And is not the reporter entitled to state his own opinion

47. Id. at 2707.
48. See id. at 2699. The only other logical possibility-presumably farfetched in this
particular case-would be to show that Diadiun was lying intentionally when he characterized Milkovich's behavior as ranting and not shrugging. Yet this may be the only path
open to Milkovich if he is to discharge his burden of proving that Diadiun uttered a
libelous falsehood. As Justice Brennan pointedly said in a footnote in his dissenting
opinion,
I would think that documentary or eyewitness testimony that the speaker
did not believe his own professed opinion would be required before a court
would be permitted to decide that there was sufficient evidence to find that
the statement was false and submit the question to a jury. Without such
objective evidence, a jury's judgment might be too influenced by its view of
what was said.
Id. at 2713 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that Milkovich lied both to the Board and to the common pleas
court when Milkovich told them that he had only shrugged? How
is the trial judge, reading the Supreme Court's opinion, possibly
going to figure out what the law of libel is in this case?
4. We fare no better in analyzing what, if anything, this
decision teaches lower courts when we consider the one issue
that actually divided the majority from the dissenters. Rehnquist
stated the "dispositive question" in the case as whether "a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements in the
Diadiun column imply an assertion that petitioner Milkovich
perjured himself in a judicial proceeding." 49 In dissent, Justice
Brennan found that the statements "cannot reasonably be interpreted as either stating or implying defamatory facts."'5 Brennan
pointed out that because reporter Diadiun clearly indicated that
he was not present at the trial court proceeding, no reasonable
reader could interpret him as saying that Milkovich perjured
himself at the trial.51 Nor did Diadiun ever say that Milkovich
committed perjury. Diadiun was only using exaggerated rhetoric
and hyperbole. Moreover, he sprinkled his article with such
52
cautionary words as "seemed," "probably," and "apparently."
The majority, however, said that other things in the newspaper
article implied that Milkovich committed perjury, including the
sentence, "Anyone who attended the meet . . . knows in his
heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." The dissenters,
quoting the same sentence, said that the phrase "knows in his
heart" clearly warrants the opposite-conclusion because it signals
that Diadiun "[did] not purport to have researched what everyone
54
who attended the meet knows in his heart."
It might be helpful to speculate what went on in the judicial
conference when the Justices retired to vote on Milkovich. Suppose that three Justices said, "This article is clearly libelous."
Suppose that three others, including the two Justices who eventually dissented, said, "No, it is clearly not libelous." The Justices
then quoted phrases from the article, most likely those that I
summarized in the preceding paragraph. The straw vote was
three for libel, three for free speech, and three undecided. What

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

2707.
2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2711 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2711-12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2698 (quoting Diadiun, supra note 40).
2713 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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then occurred, we might surmise, was a process akin to Kenneth
Arrow's description of the social welfare function in group decisionmaking.55 The three Justices voting for libel offered to modify
their position: instead of deciding the libel question, let a factfinder on remand decide it. The three undecided Justices went
along with this modified position, which presumably won an extra
vote from one of the three Justices who wanted to find the article
nonlibelous. As a result, seven Justices say a reasonable person
could find the article libelous, and two Justices adhere to their
original position and say that no reasonable person could find
the article libelous.
Whether my guess fits the real facts that occurred does not
matter. The dynamics of group decisionmaking should at least
make the guess plausible. What resulted was the worst possible
decision: leave the question to a jury. The initial straw vote (I
speculate) resulted in a sound division: either the article is
libelous or it is not. The Court can discover no more "facts"; a
jury has no special provenance to interpret the article any better
than a judge. Yet if a majority on the Supreme Court would not
hold that the article was libelous, and if some Justices thought
that the article was clearly privileged speech, the result may
well have been to compromise by leaving the question to a jury.
A jury will surely fare no better than the Supreme Court
Justices in interpreting the article. Some jurors will feel the way
the majority did, and some will side with the dissenters' viewpoint. Different juries will reach different results. The jury can
be no more single-minded on this point than the Court itself. One
might as well flip a coin.
Whether heads or tails comes up, no one will be the wiser
about the law of libel. There will never be another newspaper
article exactly like the one Diadiun wrote. Even in roughly similar
cases, the incoherence of the Court's opinion virtually guarantees
56
random lower court decisionmaking in this area.

55. See K. ARRow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22-33 (2d ed. 1963).
56. To be sure, a more cynical view is possible: the Court knew that its own opinion
was incoherent, but wrote it anyway just to use Millovich as a vehicle for saying that
the laws of libel do not necessarily shield matters denominated as "opinion." This
proposition may remove a source of confusion from prior cases, and it may even encourage
more libel lawsuits. Perhaps that is all the Court wants-if, as I have argued elsewhere,
the Court is really unconcerned with what happens to the parties and is interested only
in enacting broad social legislation under the guise of judicial decisionmaking. See D'Amato,
Aspects of Deconstruction: Refuting Indeterminacy with One Bold Thought, 85 Nw. U.L.
REV. 113 (1990).
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Only one difference will exist: instead of asking the juries to
determine whether the text is libelous, the Court will ask juries
to determine whether the context is libelous. And that is a
difference that makes no difference.

IV.

Is

ANY SPEECH HARMFUL PER SE?

The Supreme Court in Milkovich came close to holding as
libelous per se a statement that someone lied in court. Perhaps
an extra sensitivity to truth in judicial proceedings impels judges
to regard a charge of perjury as clearly defamatory. To be sure,
it would be convenient if courts could hold some class of utterances as per se harmful to the audience, just as in medieval
times believers considered blasphemy per se harmful to God. I
can think of no utterance as harmful per se, however, even
though many utterances can have harmful consequences to the
audience. Independent proof of harmful consequences is possible.
For example, if I write falsely that someone is a perjurer and
my writing leads to his dismissal from his job, then assuming he
proves this causal chain, my statement will have defamed that
person, and he will have an action in libel against me.
When we consider per se harmful words, however, we run up
against an indeterminate culture that is changing so rapidly in
the television age that today's startling expression is next year's
parody and the following year's playground yell. We can follow
a given expression through its initial shock value a year ago to
today's rap music lyric and to next year's television commercial.
At an accelerating and almost dizzying pace, our culture is
legitimizing expression that in the recent past it considered
outrageous, if not sinful. Can any young person today even begin
to comprehend what all the fuss was about Henry Miller's Tropic
of Cancer57 fifty years ago? Can today's film viewers put themselves in the mindset of the era of Breen and Hayes' offices and
the Legion of Decency, when motion pictures were required to
show single beds in bedroom scenes8 or when gangster movies
were not allowed to end their stories with the suggestion that
the criminal successfully got away with committing the crime?
Today's most successful standup comedians-Eddie Murphy and
Richard Pryor-use language far "dirtier" than the routines that

57. H.

MILLER, TROPIC OF CANCER (1934).

58. The idea of an adult couple contemplating retiring together to a double bed was
considered obscene.
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prompted Lenny Bruce's arrest and prosecution in the 1960's.5 9
Such television sitcoms as All in the Family routinely excoriate
minority groups with epithets that were punishable as criminal
acts under the reasoning of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire in
1942.60

The poor defendant who is caught in an utterance in a town
that has not yet heard it (but will be hearing it on prime-time
television in a year or two) could be prosecuted and sent to jail
if we accept Professor Tribe's position that "[t]he Constitution
may well allow punishment for speaking words that cause hurt
6' 1
just by their being uttered and heard.
Suppose someone calls me a "wop." Are my feelings hurt
because the epithet is true or because it is false? If someone
calls me a "mickey," presumably I should not feel hurt because
the epithet does not apply. But then, why should I feel hurt if I
am called a "wop"? Have I impliedly chosen to say that it applies
by virtue of my very declaration that the statement has harmed
me?
It seems that many levels of meaning and interpretation are
hidden in the apparently simple claim that someone is hurt just
because someone else uttered certain words. Apparently, no one
in Milkovich noticed this problem. The reporter Diadiun claimed
that Coach Milkovich was "ranting," whereas Milkovich claimed
he was only "shrugging." Presumably the actor is in the best
position to know what he is doing; Milkovich may wcll have
thought he was shrugging, may well have tried to shrug, may
well have commanded his shoulders and arms to shrug, and yet
Diadiun looked at his behavior and interpreted it as "ranting."
How credible is Diadiun's statement that Milkovich was lying
when he said he was shrugging? Milkovich may have sincerely
thought he was shrugging. Perhaps Diadiun's statement should
be interpreted only as saying, "I saw Milkovich ranting; he later
told the court he was shrugging, but it sure looked like ranting
to me." Perhaps that is what we should interpret Diadiun as
really saying when he wrote that Milkovich lied to the court
when he told the court he was shrugging.

59. My favorite example of meta-mindless censorship occurs in the rerecording of Cole
Porter's "Anything Goes" in the 1950's. Porter's original lyrics, written in 1934, were:
"Good authors, too, who once knew better words, Now only use four-letter words writing
prose-anything goes!" These lyrics were considered too suggestive for radio broadcast
in the 1950's, so the phrase "four-letter words" was changed to "three-letter words."
60. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
61. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, S 12-10, at 856.
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As far as Milkovich is concerned, he could have interpreted
Diadiun's statement as only Diadiun's erroneous interpretation
of what Milkovich intended to do. Milkovich, as actor, is in no
better position to say definitively that he was in fact shrugging
instead of ranting than Diadiun, as observer, was to say that
Milkovich was ranting instead of shrugging. Milkovich is in a
better internal position only to know his own mind, and because
we, as readers or even as jurors, know that Diadiun could not
have known what was in Milkovich's mind, we cannot credibly
conclude that Diadiun's statement that Milkovich was lying was
anything other than an abbreviated and hyperbolic way of saying,
"I saw him ranting even though he told the court he was shrugging and even though he may have thought that he was only
shrugging."
Strong social pressures compel us to find certain utterances
harmful per se. The Catholic Church used to publish a list of
"condemned books" that it forbade Catholics to read 62 because
those books might tempt Catholic readers to stray from the faith.
Many groups agitate for media censorship of epithets that they
say degrade them. There is always an A who is worried about
the effect on B of what C says. The best strategy for A is to
argue that C's words are harmful in themselves. That way, A
spares himself or herself the need to prove actual harm to B. In
the area of censorship, obviating the need of such proof is often
critical because B usually desires access to the very material
that A is trying to suppress in order to prevent harm to B.
The area of pornography regulation illustrates well this point.
Suppose A wants to criminalize the dissemination of pornographic
materials. A has three plausible approaches. First, A might call
it nonspeech; second, nonpolitical speech; and third, harmful
speech. Decades ago, the first approach worked fairly well. In
Roth v. United States,63 the Supreme Court, capitalizing upon an
incredible blunder by petitioners' lawyers, held that "[o]bscenity
is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or
press. 6 4 The blunder that the petitioners made was their decision
not to appeal the jury determination that the materials the
petitioners circulated were "obscene." Thus, they invited the
tautology the Supreme Court was happy to give them: obscenity,

62.
63.
64.
65.

Immanuel Kant's works were on the list.
354 U.S. 476 (1957).
Id. at 485.
Id. at 481 n.8.
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whatever it might be, is not "speech" as the first amendment uses
that term. Conviction affirmed! Other attorneys in the aftermath
of Roth, however, began challenging the factual component of
arrests for disseminating pornography, arguing that the particular materials confiscated were not factually obscene.
Sixteen years after Roth, the Court reexamined "the intractable
66 The Court in Miller
obscenity problem" in Miller v. California.
attempted to lay down verbal guidelines in precisely the manner
that pragmatic indeterminacy insists must fail. The Court allowed
juries to find materials obscene if they appeal to the "prurient
interest," are "patently offensive," and lack "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." 67 Such "standards" are no
better than,8 nor even significantly different from, the "outrageousness" test that the Court invalidated in Hustler Magazine.69
Short of a case-by-case examination of all pornographic materials
by appellate courts and by the Supreme Court, along the lines
of Justice Stewart's candid "I know it when I see it,"7 ° the RothMiller content-based approach is withering away. 71 The Court has
probably reached the conclusion that no single determination that
a given X-rated movie is obscene will serve as precedent for
another, different X-rated movie. Thus, the only workable solution is for the Court to view each and every X-rated movie.
(After viewing the first dozen or so, the self-inflicted penalty
from then on would clearly be cruel and unusual.)
If calling pornography "nonspeech" cannot work because it
leaves lower courts and juries a free hand in banning individual
films, proponents of regulation early tried a second approach:
pornography is nonpolitical speech. Consider the assertion that
if the Framers intended to protect political speech, an X-rated
pornographic movie, for example, must fall outside the meaning
of the first amendment because it has no political speech content

66. 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (quoting Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,
704 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)).
67. Id. at 24.
68. That pornographic materials are now regarded as eminently "political," see infra
note 75, should be enough to blow a hole in the Miller "test."
69. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
70. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
71. See Taylor, Hard-CorePornography:A Proposalfor a PerSe Rule, 21 U. MICH. J.L.

REF. 255, 257-60 (1987-88); cf. Helms, Art, the FirstAmendment, and the NEA Controversy,
14 NovA L. REV. 317, 320-21 (1990) (Miller standard unworkable for government funding

of art).
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whatsoever. 72 The conclusion that pornography is neither "political" nor speech gained almost universal acceptance a few decades
ago. Any suggestion that one could possibly label a film of
unclothed adults engaging in quasi-acrobatic, semirhythmic activities as "speech having a political content" would have struck
academic lawyers as "weird," "clearly erroneous," "frivolous,"
and wholly outside the permissible realm of normal discourse
about law.
Today, however, some radical feminists have turned the situation around. They have asserted that pornography not only is
political speech, but it is the most basic and political of all speech.
It is ironic-and additional proof of indeterminacy-that the
leading proponents of this viewpoint nevertheless wish to ban
pornographic movies!73 They have pointed out that pornographic
movies dealing with sexual relationships between adults depict
attitudes of dominance and submission and that these attitudes
concern fundamental power relationships in our society and hence
are profoundly political. 74 Thus, instead of pornographic movies
being so unrelated to political speech that one would label any
proponent of that view a nihilist, the radical feminists have
persuaded many people, certainly myself included, that we could
hardly have expression that is more political than a pornographic
movie.

75

Of course, if a pornographic movie is political speech today, it
was political speech in the 1950's. The fact that most people did
not then recognize it as such does not mean that its nature
somehow changed between 1950 and today. What seemed like a
weird misinterpretation in the 1950's has simply become a commonplace interpretation today by virtue of our culture, and not
72. Under Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the first amendment does not protect
sexually explicit speech that is obscene. In subsequent cases, the problem of determining
whether any given expression is obscene has proved well-nigh intractable. See, e.g., Sharp
v. Texas, 414 U.S. 1118, 1119 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Paris Adult Theater I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
73. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
74. See, e.g., A. Dworkin, Pornography is a Civil Rights Issue for Women, 21 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 55, 65 (1987-88) ("the reality of pornography . . .is that it is the act of sexual
subordination of women"); MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1985).
75. "[S]exual speech is political. One core insight of modern feminism is that the
personal is political. The question of who does the dishes and rocks the cradle affects
both the nature of the home and the composition of the legislature." Hunter & Law,
BriefAmicus Curiae of FeministAnti-Censorship Taskforce, et al., in American Booksellers
Association v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 69, 119 (1987-88).
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by virtue of anything particularly different in the content of X76
rated movies.
We thus come to the third approach: calling pornography
Harmful Speech Type II. It is probably the only tactic that offers
any hope of success. All that is necessary is to convince a court
that exposure to pornographic materials per se, without particular regard to their individual content or subject matter, causes
sexual violence. This approach removes the problem of identifying
harm with content.
Former Attorney General Meese hoped the Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography would establish a basis for the per
se harmful effects of viewing pornographic materials. The Commission indeed reached a "unanimous and confident" conclusion
that "substantial exposure to sexually violent materials as described here bears a causal relationship to antisocial acts of sexual
violence and, for some subgroups, possibly to unlawful acts of
sexual violence." 77 Armed with this governmental commission's
"finding" of a "causal relationship," prosecutors are achieving
increasing success in banning the dissemination of pornographic
materials in cities and towns across the United States. 78 Their
strategy is a good one, not only because busy courts are apt to
take the finding of causal relationship by a governmental commission at face value, but also from the point of view discussed
in this Essay that the harm appears to be separate from the
question of the particular content of the materials. So long as a
court labels the materials "pornographic" in the broad sense of
that term, the Court can simply tack on the Pornography Commission's finding of "causal relationship" and thus prove the
requisite social harm.
One may, however, challenge this harmful speech approach to
pornography on two grounds. First, the Commission's key finding
of causal relationship may have been spurious. I argued in another

76. I have made this point with respect to the constitutional provision regarding the
age of the President. I used a futuristic context as a vehicle for reinterpreting that
provision and then argued that even today the existence in the imagination of such a
potential context could radically reinterpret the present legal significance of the constitutional provision. See D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction:The "Easy Case" of the UnderAged President,84 Nw. U.L. REV. 250, 255 (1989).
77. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., FINAL
REPORT 326 (1986).
78. See D'Amato, A New PoliticalTruth: Exposure to Sexually Violent Materals Causes
Sexual Violence, 31 Wis. & MARY L. REV. 575, 575 n.2 (1990).
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issue of this Journal that the finding of causation was scientifically erroneous; it was just a political invention designed to
manufacture a harm that could give prosecutors of pornography
a non-content-based weapon.7 9 More significant from a jurisprudential standpoint, a court's actual labelling of certain materials
as pornographic is necessarily indeterminate and will shift from
case to case and over time.s ' R-rated movies are increasingly
encroaching on the domain of what used to be labelled X-rated.8 '
Zoning and public display ordinances do not solve the problem
of what is pornographic, but at best deflect it to other fields of
battle.82 It seems that no way exists to instruct lower courts in
making content-based distinctions on what is pornography and
what is not, even if courts are given freedom to pick and choose
among X-rated movies those that are legally obscene.8 Yet there
is momentum in this area due to the zealousness of certain
prosecutors taking up Mr. Meese's crusade against pornography.8
The root problem in pornography is similar to that in Milkovich.
In Milkovich, the Court assumed from the content of the alleged
libel-that one person accused another person of lying to a
court-that the latter was in fact harmed. As I have argued in

79. I attempted such an argument at length. See id. at 578-604.
80. Contributing to the uncertainty is the background cultural perception regarding
the AIDS epidemic that perhaps, after all, viewing pornographic materials is a desirable
form of "safe sex."
81. Theatrical-release movies are invariably more extreme than those shown on network
television because of the commercial need to lure people away from free television and
get them to pay for tickets to the cinema. But the time period for theatrical-release
movies to be shown on television is getting increasingly shorter; the movies go from
theatre to cable to VCR to network television. Hence, the theatrical releases predictably
should increase ever more rapidly in sexual explicitness. What this increase means is
that soft-core pornography is bombarding our culture such that the average viewer will
soon become jaded, if not insensitive, to the harder-core material. In the predictable
future, prosecutors of pornography will find it increasingly difficult to get juries to return
convictions. (Over the longer term, however, one cannot rule out a massive social revulsion
against pornography and a "born-again" approach to its regulation that could take us
back to more innocent times.)
82. See, e.g., Staffelbach, Pope v. Illinois: Suggestions for Civil Regulations of NonObscene PornographicMaterial and Adult Businesses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 131 (1989).
83. The assumed line between pornography and nonpornography would be located in
the region of soft pornography. In contrast, if we take the radical feminist position that
pornography is a form of highly political speech, the assumed line between politicalspeech pornography and non-political-speech pornography would be located at the opposite
end of the spectrum-in the extreme hard-core region of pornography. Under the radical
feminist view, see supra note 75, the more violent and sadomasochistic the film, the more
its message is clearly political! Thus, the (hopeless) attempt by lower courts to define
pornography is being challenged at both ends of the spectrum!
84. See Cohn, The Trials of Adam and Eve: Are the Feds being overzealous in fighting
porn?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 7, 1991, at 48.
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this Essay, one of the biggest mistakes that one can make in the
free speech area is to deduce from the content of the utterance
the fact of harm. The claimant should prove harm independently
from the utterance if we are to give free speech breathing room.
If particular pornographic materials cause harm, one must demonstrate that harm by tests other than having the trier of fact
look at the pornographic materials and guess whether they would
85
cause harm.
Both the majority and dissent in Milkovich86 prominently cited
Hustler Magazine. I think that fact betokens an implicit recognition that what is at issue in all Type II areas of harmful speech,
including individual and group libel and pornography, is the
indeterminacy of lower court decisionmaking. The only rational
way to respond to the fact of such indeterminacy is to deny a
cause of action to anyone who alleges that an utterance itself
caused harm. That is the road I believe the Court is generally
taking. I believe that future cases will interpret the very incoherence of the Milkovich result as a point in favor of the indeterminacy recognized as the decisional basis in Hustler Magazine.
Grounding judicial protection of speech on the uncertainty of
lower court results should eventually reduce the incidence of
defamation cases and maybe even catch up to the permissiveness
in the pornography area that is already part of our culture.

85. See D'Amato, supra note 78, at 587-90 (describing and criticizing such psychological
tests).
86. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).

